Experimental 4-intensity decoy-state quantum key distribution with
  asymmetric basis detector efficiency by Liu, Hui et al.
Experimental 4-intensity decoy-state quantum key distribution
with asymmetric basis detector efficiency
Hui Liu1, 2, Zong-Wen Yu3, 4, Mi Zou1, 2, Yan-Lin Tang7, Yong Zhao7,
Jun Zhang1, 2, Xiang-Bin Wang3, 5, 6,∗ Teng-Yun Chen1, 2,† Jian-Wei Pan1, 2‡
1Hefei National Laboratory for Physical Sciences at Microscale and Department of Modern Physics,
University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei, Anhui 230026, China
2CAS Center for Excellence in Quantum Information and Quantum Physics,
University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei, Anhui 230026, China
3State Key Laboratory of Low Dimensional Quantum Physics,
Department of Physics, Tsinghua University,
Beijing 100084, People’s Republic of China
4Data Communication Science and Technology Research Institute,
Beijing 100191, People’s Republic of China
5Jinan Institute of Quantum Technology, SAICT,
Jinan 250101, People’s Republic of China
6Department of Physics, Southern University of Science and Technology,
Shenzhen, 518055, People’s Republic of China
7QuantumCTek Corporation Limited, Hefei, Anhui 230088, China
The decoy-state method has been developed rapidly in quantum key distribution
(QKD) since it is immune to photon-number splitting attacks. However, two basis
detector efficiency asymmetry, which exists in realistic scenarios, has been ignored in
the prior results. By using the recent 4-intensity decoy-state optimization protocol,
we report the first implementation of high-rate QKD with asymmetric basis detector
efficiency, demonstrating 1.9 to 33.2 times higher key rate than previous protocols in
the situation of large basis detector efficiency asymmetry. The results ruled out an
implicitly assumption in QKD that the efficiency of Z basis and X basis are restricted
to be same. This work pave the way towards a more practical QKD setting.
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2INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) has continuously been focused since the first protocol
proposed by Bennett and Brassard in 19841. However, the unconditionally security of the
ideal BB84 has been frustrated by a lot of realistic imperfections, one prominent of which
is the lack of the practical single photon source. It is more feasible for Alice to utilize
the attenuated laser, i.e., the weak coherent pulses (WCP) as signal states, which results
in a loophole for the photon-number splitting (PNS) attack2,3. Fortunately, based on the
original idea by Hwang4, the decoy-state method5,6 appeared in time. It has dramatically
improve the performance of QKD with the attenuated laser by providing better bounds on
the gain and the error rate of single photon states. In the past decade, noteworthy theoretical
improvements have been proposed to continuously improve the performance of decoy-state
QKD7–10. Experiments either over optical fiber or free-space have advanced significantly in
the meantime11–20. Specially, QKD has been demonstrated at a transmission distance up to
7600 km in free-space20 and more than 400 km in optical fiber16,19.
Nevertheless, the practical applications of QKD combined with the one-time pad scheme
are still pinned by low secure key rate. In addition, an implicit assumption for detector
model in the existed results is that the efficiencies of Z basis and X basis are almost the
same. It seems like a simple assumption but does not always meet realistic scenarios. For
instance, it could be resulted from the efficiency asymmetry of single photon detectors in the
passive basis choice protocol, or the imperfection during measurment bases switching in the
active basis choice protocol. A common approach is reducing higher efficiency to balance
detector efficiency asymmetry at the price of introducing additional losses.
Here, by making simple modifications to a commercial QKD system, we implement a novel
4-intensity decoy-state QKD protocol using biased bases21, which can provide higher key
rate than previous traditional 3-intensity protocols with unbiased bases, especially in a large
degree of basis detector efficiency asymmetry. Setting the detector efficiency asymmetry of
two bases ηZ/ηX = 2 and 10 respectively, we change channel distance over different lengths
of standard telecom fiber up to 150 km and demonstrate as much as 1.9 to 33.2 times higher
key rate than previous protocols. These results have moved QKD towards a more practical
setting.
3THEORY
In the novel 4-intensity QKD protocol21, Alice prepares two different coherent sources
in the Z basis with intensities µZ1 and µZ2 ; and two different coherent sources in the X
basis with intensities µX1 and µX2 , with probabilities pαj(α = Z,X; j = 1, 2) respectively.
Without losing the generality, we assume µα1 < µα2(α = Z,X). The coherent state whose
phase is selected uniformly at random can be regard as a mixture of photon number states,
i.e., ραj =
∑
k ak,αj |k〉〈k| with ak,αj = e−µαjµkαj/k! for α = Z,X and j = 1, 2. In the
protocol, Bob measures the received pulses in the Z and X bases with probabilities qZ and
qX respectively. After the preparation and measurement of Nt pulses, Alice and Bob obtain
the observable Nωαj and M
ω
αj
which are the number of successful counts and error counts
when Alice sends the pulses from source αj and Bob measures them in the ω basis. Here
α and ω can take both Z and X. We also denote Sωαj and T
ω
αj
as the yield and error yield,
respectively, with Sωαj = N
ω
αj
/(pαjq
ωNt) and T
ω
αj
= Mωαj/(pαjq
ωNt).
In Ref.21, a delicate point has been put forward that even in the asymptotic case, i.e.,
sZ0 6= sX0 and sZ1,α1 6= sX1,α2 . Here sωk,αj is the yield of k-photon pulses prepared from source
αj and measured in the ω basis. The reason s
Z
1,Z 6= sX1,X is simply due to the asymmetry
of detection efficiencies and dark counts in different bases. Such asymmetry can come from
either imperfect control of two of the devices inside Labs, or Eve’s attack. In order to take a
better treatment, the decoy-state method jointly in different bases has been studied21. For
this goal, the observed number of counts of pulses prepared in one basis but measured in
another basis shall be used. In particular, it is assumed that sZ1,Z = s
Z
1,X and s
X
1,Z = s
X
1,X are
valid. Given these equations, one does not have to study the decoy-state method completely
separately in each basis.
In all real experiment, the total number of pulses sent by Alice is finite. In order to
extract the secret final key, we have to consider the effect of statistical fluctuations caused
by the finite size. In this case, yields of the same state out of different sources are not always
rigorously equal to each other, i.e., sωk,α1 6= sωk,α2 . Accordingly21, with the observed values
Sωαj , one can lower bound the mean value 〈sω1,α〉 for a given value of 〈sω0 〉 with the following
equations
〈sω1,α〉 ≥ 〈sω,L1 〉 = max
α=Z,X
[〈sω,L1,α 〉(〈sω0 〉)], (1)
4and
〈sω,L1,α 〉(〈sω0 〉) =
1
A1,2α1α2
[
a2,α2S
ω
α1
− a2,α1Sωα2 − A0,2α1α2〈sω0 〉
]
, (2)
where A0,2α1α2 = a0,α1a2,α2−a0,α2a2,α1 , A1,2α1α2 = a1,α1a2,α2−a1,α2a2,α1 , and Sωαj = Sωαj/(1+δωαj),
S
ω
αj
= Sωαj/(1 − δωαj). By using the multiplicative form of the Chernoff bound, with a fixed
failure probability , we can give an interval of 〈Sωαj〉 with the observable Sωαj , [Sωαj , S
ω
αj
],
which can bound the value of 〈Sωαj〉 with a probability of at least 1− . Explicitly, we have
δωαj = δ(N
ω
αj
Sωαj , ) with the function δ(x, y) = [− ln(y/2) +
√
(ln(y/2))2 − 8 ln(y/2)x]/(2x).
With the mean values 〈sω,L1 〉 defined in Eq.(1), the lower bounds of sα1,α2(α = Z,X) can be
calculated with
sα,L1,α2 = 〈sα,L1 〉(1− δ1,α2), (3)
where δ1,α2 = δ(N
α
1,α2
〈Sα,L1 〉, ). Here and after, we define Nωk,αj = ak,αjpαjqωNt as the number
of k-photon pulses prepared in source αj and measured in the basis ω.
Second, we can also formulate the phase-flip error rate of single-photon states. Explicitly,
we have
eph1,Z = e
X
1,X1
≤ eX,U1,X1 =
T
X
X1
− a0,X1〈sX0 〉(1− δX0,X1)/2
a1,X1s
X,L
1,X1
, (4)
where δX0,X1 = δ(N
X
0,X1
〈sX0 〉, ). In a finite-key-size case, we can apply the large data size
approximation of the random sampling method to upper bound the phase error rate ep,Z1 of
single-photon pulses prepared and measured in the Z basis with the failure probability 
ep,Z1 ≤ ep,Z,U1 = eX,U1,X1 + θXZ , (5)
where θXZ =
√
nθ/dθ with dθ =
(1−gX)gX ln 2
2(1−e1)e1 , nθ = − log[
√
e1(1− e1)nXnZ/(nX + nZ)]/(nX+
nZ), and gX =
nX
nX+nZ
. Here we write nX = N
X
1,X1
, nZ = N
Z
1,Z2
and e1 = e
X,U
1,X1
for simplicity.
Note that ep,Z,U1 is a function of 〈sX0 〉. Straightly, we can also formulate the upper bound
of the phase-flip error rate of single-photon counts in the X basis, being denoted by ep,X,U1 .
We omit the explicit formula here since it is just trivially written analogically to Eq.(5).
Note that 〈sX0 〉 (or 〈sZ0 〉) is the common variable in both quantities sX,L1,X2 and ep,Z,U1 (
or quantities sZ,L1,Z2 and e
p,X,U
1 ) shown in Eq.(3) and Eq.(5) respectively. We need to know
the range of them for the final key rate calculation. In the 4-intensity protocol without the
5assumption of vacuum, we can lower bound 〈sω0 〉 by
〈sω0 〉 ≥ 〈sω,L0 〉 = max
α=X,Z
{〈sω,L0 〉(α), 0}, (6)
where
〈sω0 〉 ≥ 〈sω,L0 〉(α) =
a1,α2S
ω
α1
− a1,α1Sωα2
A0,1α1α2
, (7)
and A0,1α1α2 = a0,α1a1,α2−a0,α2a1,α1 . By simply attributing all the errors to the vacuum pulses,
we can upper bound of 〈sX0 〉 with
〈sω0 〉 ≤ 〈sω,U0 〉 = min{2T ωω1/a0,ω1 , S
ω
Z1
/a0,Z1 , S
ω
X1
/a0,X1}. (8)
With these preparations, the final key rate of the 4-intensity protocol can be calculated
with the following worst-case estimation
R = min
〈sZ0 〉,〈sX0 〉
[R(〈sZ0 〉, 〈sX0 〉)] (9)
over the region for all possible values of 〈sZ0 〉 and 〈sX0 〉 in [〈sZ,L0 〉, 〈sZ,U0 〉] and [〈sX,L0 〉, 〈sX,U0 〉],
respectively. Here
R(〈sZ0 〉, 〈sX0 〉) = RZ(〈sZ0 〉, 〈sX0 〉) +RX(〈sZ0 〉, 〈sX0 〉), (10)
and
Rα(〈sZ0 〉, 〈sX0 〉) = pα2qα{a1,α2sα,L1,α2 [1−H(ep,α,U1 )]− fSαα2H(Eαα2)}, (11)
for α = Z,X. Here f is the efficiency factor of the error-correction method used, H(x) =
−x log2(x)− (1− x) log2(1− x) is the binary Shannon entropy function. Note that in such
a case we need to calculate the final key rate with two variables 〈sZ0 〉 and 〈sX0 〉 jointly.
EXPERIMENT
The polarization encoding is implemented in our experiment. FIG.1 illustrates the scheme
of our experimental setup. The Z and X basis consists of {|H〉, |V 〉} and {|+〉, |−〉}, respec-
tively, as four states for the standard BB84 protocol. The signals are generated at a system
6clock rate of 625 MHz by 8 DFB lasers, half of which are used for generating signal state
and the rest are used for decoy state. Alice encodes her qubits in Z or X basis in accordance
with random bit values generated beforehand. The pulse width is about 100 ps and its
wavelength center is at 1550.12 nm. These pulses are naturally phase randomized due to
direct modulation onto DFB lasers. Utilizing 8 manual attenuators after each DFB laser,
Alice realizes the intensity ratio of two intensities in each basis approximately. None of the
DFB laser generated the pulse when vacuum pulse are need. Four PMBSs, two PMPBSs
and a SMBS server for guiding pulses from different diodes to one optical fiber. The optical
pulse intensity is strongly attenuated to single-photon level via an EVOA.
A 10 GHz FBG is inserted at Alice for three reasons. First, it guarantees that the
spectrum of 8 DFB lasers are overlapped in a narrow range to get rid of the loopholes
exploiting the pulses wavelength discrepancies. The second issue is that it achieves fine
adjustment of the state intensities coordinated with the precise temperature control of the
DFB laser. At last, it reduces the chromatic dispersion effects in long single-mode optical
fiber. A suitable Dispersion Compensating Fiber is installed to compensate dispersion effects
further and compress the pulses width, which guarantees that the pulse width is smaller than
the detector effective gate width after long distance propagation.
The synchronization pulses are generated by a 1570 nm DFB laser operating at 100 kHz.
In order to synchronize the entire experimental systems and reduce optical fiber costs, the
synchronization pulses emitted from Alice are multiplexed with signal pulses by a 100 G
DWDM and transmitted through the same single-mode optical fiber to Bob. A SOA is
utilized to amplify the intensity of synchronization pulses to guarantee that Bob’s PD receive
sufficient optical power. A DWDM inserted before his PD is typically introduced filter
undesired noise from the SOA.
Naively, Bob passively selects the measurement basis by a 1×2 SMBS with the splitting
ratio of qX . It indicates that the received photons are measured either on the X or Z basis
randomly with probabilities of qX and qZ = 1 − qX , respectively. Cooled to −50 ◦C, four
InGaAs APDs operating in gated Geiger mode are used to detect signals at 1.25 GHz gating
frequency. The effective gating window width is 180 ps and the dead time is 500 ps, which is
an optimal trade-off between the detection efficiency and the after pulses rate. The detection
efficiency is about 10% at a dark count probability of 2.50×10−7 per gate. For convenience,
we inserted two 3 dB or even 10 dB attenuations, one before each of two APDs for X basis, to
7get a larger efficiency asymmetry and demonstrate the effectiveness of difference protocols.
We thus regard the attenuations as a part of the APDs.
Alice and Bob have to develop a stable polarization reference frame initially owing to the
polarization mode dispersion (PMD) effects in long distance single-mode optical fiber. Bob
applies corresonding DC voltage on a pair of EPCs to align Alice’s polarization states to
the polarizing axes of the PBSs inserted before the APDs. The optical misalignment error
rate ed is around 1.5%. Note that the optical misalignment error rate of Z and X basis are
independent. The polarization can remain stable for more than 20 minutes, which is long
enough for our experiment.
RESULTS
Using same system parameters in TableI to perform a numerical optimization for con-
sistency and taking the effects of statistical fluctuations into account, we implement three
decoy-state BB84 protocols: (I) traditional 3-intensity protocol7 with basis detector ef-
ficiency symmetry, where Bob reduce higher detecotor efficiency to balance asymemetry
ηZ = ηX ; (II) 3-intensity protocol with basis detector efficiencies asymmetry
21, where in
both bases, Alice select the same intensities and proportions, and Bob measures the received
pulses with the same probabilities, that is, qZ = qX = 50%; (III) 4-intensity protocol
21, where
qZ 6= qX . In all protocols, the signal pulses µZ2 and µX2 are used for key generation, while
other intensity pulses are used as decoy states to estimate the amount of privacy amplifica-
tion necessary. The extra insertion loss in Bob is about 2.5-2.7 dB due to different BSs in
different protocols. Thanks to the high clock rate, sufficient signal pulses are send by Alice
during an uninterrupted session lasting 16.16 s to calculate the final key rate. We repeat
the experiment 30 times and calculate the average and variance of the final key rate, which
is shown in FIG.2. Details of the main implementation parameters and results are shown in
the Supplemental Material.
In the first experiment, we set the detector efficiency of the InGaAs APD ηZ = 10% and
ηX = 5%, that is, the asymmetry ηZ/ηX = 2, and change the distance between Alice and
Bob from 87 km to 150 km. The results are shown in FIG.2 (a). Consequently, 4-intensity
protocol dramatically gives measurable advantage over two types of 3-intensity protocol.
For example, 4-intensity protocol obtain a key rate of 39 kbps in 87 km, which is 3.0 times
8that of 3-intensity protocol and 4.8 times that of 3-intensity protocol with basis detector
efficiencies symmetry. And 4-intensity yield a secret key rate of 36.7 bps in a maximal
distance of 150 km. In contrast, not even a bit of secure key can be extracted with both two
types of 3-intensity. In the second experiment, we increase the mismatch on purpose and
set ηZ = 10% and ηX = 1%. FIG. 2(b) presents the experiment results. The experiment
data of the 87 km case is used as an example to demonstrate the improvement of 4-intensity
protocol. 4-intensity protocol obtain a key rate of 20 kbps in 87 km, which is 3.6 times
that of 3-intensity protocol and 33.2 times that of 3-intensity protocol with basis detector
efficiencies symmetry.
CONCLUSION
In summary, we have demonstrated, for the first time, an implementation of decoy-state
QKD system with asymmetric basis detector efficiencies by the recent 4-intensity decoy-state
optimization protocol. The secure key rate is higher than previous traditional 3-intensity
protocols with unbiased bases results by 1.9 to 33.2 times. Besides, our results ruled out an
implicitly assumption in QKD that the efficiency of Z basis and X basis are restricted to
be same. Therefore, the implementation is an excellent candidate for future quantum key
distribution.
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FIG. 1. Schematic layout of the experiment. DFB Laser: distributed feedback laser, Att: manual
attenuator, PM: polarization maintaining, SM: single mode, BS: beam splitter, PBS: polarization
beam splitter, EVOA: electrical variable optical attenuator, FBG: fiber Bragg grating, DCF: dis-
persion compensating fiber, DWDM: dense wavelength division multiplexer, SOA: semiconductor
optical amplifier, EPC: electric polarization controllers, PD: photoelectric detector, APD: avalanche
photodiode.
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FIG. 2. Experimentally (symbols) and simulated (solid lines) secret key rates in bps versus the
transmission distance in standard optical fiber. (a) the detector efficiency {ηZ , ηX} is fixed at {10%,
5%},while the experimental transmission distance are selected at 87, 126, 141 and 150 km. (b) the
detector efficiency {ηZ , ηX} is fixed at {10%, 1%}, while the experimental transmission distance
are selected at 62, 87, 107 and 126 km. Blue squares, green diamonds and red circles, respectively,
refers to (I) traditional 3-intensity protocol7 basis detector efficiencies symmetry, where Bob reduce
higher detecotor effiency to balance asymemetry ηZ = ηX = 5% or 1%; (II) 3-intensity protocol
with basis detector efficiencies asymmetry21, where uX2 = uZ2 , uX1 = uZ1 , qz = qx, ηZ 6= ηX ; (III)
4-intensity protocol21, where uX2 6= uZ2 , uX1 6= uZ1 , qZ 6= qX , ηZ 6= ηX . The experimental results
are the average and variance (1 standard deviation, assuming Poissonian detection statistics) of
the final key rate calculated by 30 experiments. The advantage of the 4-intensity protocol is
clearly verified by the experimental results, especially in a large degree of basis detector efficiencies
asymmetry. The results also confirm the excellent stability of three protocols used here.
13
TABLE I. List of parameters characterized for numerical optimization: detector dark count rate
s0,detector After Pulses rate Ar, Detector dead time td in second, misalignment-error probability
ed, channel loss coefficient α in dB/km, error-correction efficiency f , security parameter , and the
total number of laser pulses N
s0 Ar td ed α f  N
2.50× 10−7 1% 5.00× 10−7 1.5% 0.2 1.14 10−10 1010
[!ht]
[!ht]
[!ht]
14
T
A
B
L
E
II
.
L
is
t
of
th
e
m
a
in
im
p
le
m
en
ta
ti
o
n
p
ar
am
et
er
s.
H
er
e,
T
h
e
n
ot
at
io
n
u
α
j
sh
ow
n
in
th
e
fi
rs
t
co
lu
m
n
d
en
ot
es
th
e
in
te
n
si
ty
of
th
e
co
h
er
en
t
so
u
rc
e
α
j
.
p
α
j
is
th
e
p
ro
b
ab
il
it
y
to
u
se
th
e
so
u
rc
e
α
j
in
th
e
p
ro
to
co
l.
p
0
is
th
e
p
ro
b
ab
il
it
y
to
ch
o
os
e
th
e
va
cu
u
m
so
u
rc
e.
q X
is
th
e
p
ro
b
a
b
il
it
y
th
at
B
o
b
m
ea
su
re
s
th
e
re
ce
iv
ed
p
u
ls
es
in
th
e
X
b
as
is
.
P
ar
am
et
er
s
62
k
m
(1
2.
4d
B
)
87
k
m
(1
7.
4d
B
)
10
7k
m
(2
1.
4d
B
)
12
6k
m
(2
5.
2d
B
)
10
%
1%
3I
N
T
(1
%
1%
)
3I
N
T
4I
N
T
3I
N
T
(1
%
1%
)
3I
N
T
4I
N
T
3I
N
T
4I
N
T
4I
N
T
u
X
2
0.
13
4
0.
14
5
0.
41
8
0.
51
5
0.
50
1
0.
71
4
0.
49
9
0.
67
1
0.
56
0
u
Z
2
0.
13
4
0.
14
5
0.
47
0
0.
51
5
0.
50
1
0.
45
3
0.
49
9
0.
44
9
0.
42
9
u
X
1
0.
52
2
0.
49
2
0.
17
5
0.
14
8
0.
16
9
0.
20
6
0.
17
9
0.
20
6
0.
20
4
u
Z
1
0.
52
2
0.
49
2
0.
02
6
0.
14
8
0.
16
9
0.
04
1
0.
17
9
0.
05
4
0.
06
5
p X
2
0.
40
6
0.
41
8
0.
03
0
0.
32
7
0.
36
5
0.
03
2
0.
27
2
0.
04
0
0.
03
4
p Z
2
0.
40
6
0.
41
8
0.
75
4
0.
32
7
0.
36
5
0.
69
3
0.
27
2
0.
57
7
0.
28
8
p X
1
0.
08
3
0.
06
4
0.
11
0
0.
15
4
0.
10
7
0.
13
2
0.
18
4
0.
17
0
0.
29
1
p Z
1
0.
08
3
0.
06
4
0.
10
5
0.
15
4
0.
10
7
0.
14
3
0.
18
4
0.
21
4
0.
38
7
p 0
0.
02
2
0.
03
6
N
U
L
L
0.
03
8
0.
05
5
N
U
L
L
0.
08
8
N
U
L
L
N
U
L
L
q X
50
%
50
%
15
%
50
%
50
%
24
%
50
%
36
%
55
%
10
%
5%
87
k
m
(1
7.
4d
B
)
12
6k
m
(2
5.
2d
B
)
14
1k
m
(2
8.
2d
B
)
15
0k
m
(3
0.
0d
B
)
u
X
2
0.
52
4
0.
52
1
0.
47
3
0.
51
3
0.
51
3
0.
45
1
0.
51
2
0.
62
1
0.
57
2
u
Z
2
0.
52
4
0.
52
1
0.
51
6
0.
51
3
0.
51
3
0.
44
5
0.
51
2
0.
45
9
0.
52
3
u
X
1
0.
12
7
0.
12
5
0.
17
0
0.
14
9
0.
15
3
0.
19
6
0.
15
1
0.
31
2
0.
26
2
u
Z
1
0.
12
7
0.
12
5
0.
02
0
0.
14
9
0.
15
3
0.
04
1
0.
15
1
0.
07
0
0.
11
1
p X
2
0.
42
1
0.
42
8
0.
01
9
0.
29
4
0.
33
1
0.
03
7
0.
20
0
0.
05
5
0.
09
8
p Z
2
0.
42
1
0.
42
8
0.
77
2
0.
29
4
0.
33
1
0.
53
1
0.
20
0
0.
33
8
0.
17
5
p X
1
0.
06
9
0.
06
2
0.
11
6
0.
18
3
0.
14
9
0.
17
2
0.
26
2
0.
23
5
0.
22
8
p Z
1
0.
06
9
0.
06
2
0.
09
4
0.
18
3
0.
14
9
0.
25
9
0.
26
2
0.
37
2
0.
49
9
p 0
0.
02
0
0.
02
0
N
U
L
L
0.
04
5
0.
04
1
N
U
L
L
0.
07
6
N
U
L
L
N
U
L
L
q X
50
%
50
%
13
%
50
%
50
%
24
%
50
%
34
%
50
%
15
T
A
B
L
E
II
I.
L
is
t
o
f
th
e
av
er
a
g
e
an
d
va
ri
an
ce
(1
st
an
d
ar
d
d
ev
ia
ti
on
,
as
su
m
in
g
P
oi
ss
on
ia
n
d
et
ec
ti
on
st
at
is
ti
cs
)
of
th
e
to
ta
l
ga
in
s
an
d
er
ro
r
g
a
in
s
in
th
e
ca
se
s
o
f
{η
z
=
1
0
%
,η
x
=
5
%
}.
T
h
e
n
ot
at
io
n
α
j
β
sh
ow
n
in
th
e
se
co
n
d
co
lu
m
n
d
en
ot
es
th
e
p
u
ls
e
fr
om
A
li
ce
so
u
rc
e
α
j
an
d
th
e
b
as
is
β
ch
os
en
b
y
B
o
b
,
re
sp
ec
ti
ve
ly
.
P
ar
am
et
er
s
10
%
5%
87
k
m
(1
7.
4d
B
)
12
6k
m
(2
5.
2d
B
)
14
1k
m
(2
8.
2d
B
)
15
0k
m
(3
0.
0d
B
)
3I
N
T
(5
%
5%
)
3I
N
T
4I
N
T
3I
N
T
(5
%
5%
)
3I
N
T
4I
N
T
3I
N
T
4I
N
T
4I
N
T
T
ot
al
G
ai
n
s
X
2
X
55
14
18
.8
±1
35
13
.4
55
61
53
.6
±3
71
3.
5
57
09
.1
±1
77
.0
64
97
4.
3
±4
99
.2
73
65
5.
5
±1
05
3.
5
36
98
.1
±7
6.
9
22
63
6.
7
±2
02
.6
53
35
.4
±1
03
.4
84
41
.0
±1
56
.3
X
1
X
22
24
6.
4
±7
23
.4
19
23
4.
5
±2
06
.0
13
82
6.
9
±2
51
.1
12
37
6.
7
±3
23
.4
10
12
2.
4
±4
25
.9
74
99
.0
±3
02
.5
94
22
.2
±1
30
.1
11
36
9.
8
±3
02
.5
94
16
.2
±9
4.
4
X
0
X
14
5.
6±
18
.8
14
3.
6±
10
.8
N
U
L
L
14
4.
2±
12
.9
13
0.
7±
14
.3
N
U
L
L
21
0.
2±
16
.5
N
U
L
L
N
U
L
L
Z
2
Z
53
22
57
.2
±1
36
06
.8
10
72
60
6.
3
±6
74
9.
1
33
40
95
0.
6
±2
76
45
.2
63
24
7.
3
±9
70
.7
14
30
18
.1
±3
54
3.
1
30
23
14
.4
±2
09
1.
8
43
93
3.
5
±6
13
.3
86
86
1.
5
±1
53
4.
9
25
80
0.
8
±2
85
.3
Z
1
Z
22
07
5.
4
±6
48
.5
38
12
2.
8
±3
48
.8
18
90
8.
5
±2
48
.9
12
37
6.
7
±1
77
.4
19
89
3.
0
±3
14
.7
15
81
5.
0
±3
82
.9
18
06
7.
7
±3
79
.3
16
30
6.
8
±2
77
.3
17
44
6.
6
±2
18
.3
Z
0
Z
14
4.
3±
17
.5
26
4.
4±
19
.3
N
U
L
L
14
0.
1±
12
.5
15
5.
9±
14
.9
N
U
L
L
21
2.
3±
17
.2
N
U
L
L
N
U
L
L
X
2
Z
54
78
10
.9
±1
25
36
.7
10
68
91
8.
4
±9
10
5.
1
74
11
8.
7
±8
35
.2
65
44
7.
0
±5
19
.5
14
51
19
.9
±1
85
1.
1
21
74
5.
1
±2
71
.7
44
75
6.
9
±7
36
.4
19
22
0.
3
±2
93
.2
15
89
0.
5
±1
64
.8
X
1
Z
21
82
5.
1
±7
08
.7
38
40
9.
7
±2
98
.8
16
85
26
.6
±3
11
5.
7
12
05
1.
5
±3
01
.1
19
63
6.
4
±5
85
.8
43
21
1.
6
±1
44
2.
8
17
56
0.
9
±3
36
.7
39
67
7.
8
±6
83
.9
16
69
6.
5
±2
52
.0
X
0
Z
14
4.
8±
16
.4
25
4.
9±
16
.8
N
U
L
L
14
5.
2±
14
.0
15
4.
7±
15
.2
N
U
L
L
20
7.
6±
14
.9
N
U
L
L
N
U
L
L
Z
2
X
53
93
97
.7
±1
46
26
.5
53
82
31
.6
±4
59
4.
5
26
43
07
.1
±3
41
7.
4
64
80
9.
0
±9
26
.4
71
79
6.
5
±2
78
2.
3
50
91
8.
5
±5
15
.7
22
17
0.
3
±2
74
.8
24
15
5.
9
±4
24
.6
13
26
7.
3
±2
18
.8
Z
1
X
22
20
3.
6
±5
38
.0
19
72
8.
7
±2
47
.8
18
43
.7
±4
9.
6
12
40
1.
1
±1
63
.2
10
29
2.
6
±2
36
.7
34
53
.1
±7
3.
3
95
51
.0
±1
26
.3
55
20
.6
±9
7.
3
10
02
3.
2
±1
00
.0
Z
0
X
14
4.
5±
17
.4
14
2.
5±
14
.1
N
U
L
L
13
8.
1±
11
.5
13
1.
4±
13
.9
N
U
L
L
21
1.
5±
17
.8
N
U
L
L
N
U
L
L
E
rr
or
G
ai
n
s
X
2
X
91
99
.7
±2
23
6.
8
87
47
.8
±7
84
.3
14
3.
9
±1
4.
4
16
64
.3
±1
47
.5
18
40
.7
±3
12
.9
15
4.
9
±1
6.
2
85
3.
1
±1
48
.2
21
6.
6
±3
0.
8
34
0.
3
±2
7.
3
X
1
X
74
1.
8±
12
9.
3
63
5.
9±
36
.2
60
0.
8±
30
.1
70
6.
8±
32
.1
58
4.
2±
62
.7
55
4.
0±
38
.6
84
1.
0±
92
.5
74
8.
8±
66
.2
63
4.
1±
29
.1
X
0
X
73
.4
±9
.2
72
.9
±8
.2
N
U
L
L
74
.1
±9
.8
64
.9
±1
0.
3
N
U
L
L
10
6.
5±
9.
6
N
U
L
L
N
U
L
L
Z
2
Z
12
36
3.
2
±2
15
0.
4
22
00
7.
5
±3
34
1.
7
62
99
0.
5
±4
27
8.
1
19
25
.5
±2
89
.2
36
44
.1
±2
63
.3
65
33
.8
±6
40
.6
11
71
.3
±8
0.
9
24
10
.9
±2
04
.2
79
7.
1
±6
2.
7
Z
1
Z
86
4.
0
±1
07
.4
13
61
.4
±1
11
.4
19
99
.8
±9
6.
5
74
7.
4
±5
6.
6
88
6.
1
±4
3.
8
13
57
.3
±7
5.
9
97
4.
3
±4
8.
4
13
79
.0
±3
6.
7
15
33
.3
±5
7.
3
Z
0
Z
71
.8
±9
.5
13
3.
1±
12
.6
N
U
L
L
70
.7
±9
.6
79
.7
±1
0.
7
N
U
L
L
10
6.
9±
12
.1
N
U
L
L
N
U
L
L
R
1.
32
E
-0
5
±8
.0
7E
-0
7
2.
12
E
-0
5
±1
.7
7E
-0
6
6.
30
E
-0
5
±4
.0
2E
-0
6
6.
81
E
-0
7
±1
.5
0E
-0
7
1.
48
E
-0
6
±3
.2
5E
-0
7
2.
98
E
-0
6
±2
.7
7E
-0
7
1.
78
E
-0
7
±1
.0
3E
-0
7
3.
30
E
-0
7
±1
.0
4E
-0
7
5.
93
E
-0
8
±1
.7
1E
-0
8
16
T
A
B
L
E
IV
.
L
is
t
o
f
th
e
av
er
a
g
e
a
n
d
va
ri
a
n
ce
(1
st
an
d
ar
d
d
ev
ia
ti
on
,
as
su
m
in
g
P
oi
ss
on
ia
n
d
et
ec
ti
on
st
at
is
ti
cs
)
of
th
e
to
ta
l
ga
in
s
an
d
er
ro
r
g
a
in
s
in
th
e
ca
se
s
o
f
{η
z
=
1
0
%
,η
x
=
1
%
}.
T
h
e
n
ot
at
io
n
α
j
β
sh
ow
n
in
th
e
se
co
n
d
co
lu
m
n
d
en
ot
es
th
e
p
u
ls
e
fr
om
A
li
ce
so
u
rc
e
α
j
an
d
th
e
b
as
is
β
ch
os
en
b
y
B
o
b
,
re
sp
ec
ti
ve
ly
.
P
ar
am
et
er
s
10
%
1%
62
k
m
(1
2.
4d
B
)
87
k
m
(1
7.
4d
B
)
10
7k
m
(2
1.
4d
B
)
12
6k
m
(2
5.
2d
B
)
3I
N
T
(1
%
1%
)
3I
N
T
4I
N
T
3I
N
T
(1
%
1%
)
3I
N
T
4I
N
T
3I
N
T
4I
N
T
4I
N
T
T
ot
al
G
ai
n
s
X
2
X
33
03
99
.5
±6
57
3.
9
31
23
10
.7
±5
02
7.
8
60
07
.4
±1
34
.4
83
85
4.
6
±1
02
2.
9
93
97
9.
9
±1
66
1.
1
58
73
.1
±1
60
.5
28
47
3.
8
±7
34
.5
40
37
.7
±8
1.
4
19
72
.3
±5
1.
8
X
1
X
18
23
4.
3
±2
38
.5
15
30
5.
9
±1
74
.6
97
38
.6
±1
46
.1
11
90
1.
2
±3
07
.5
97
10
.8
±1
56
.2
73
66
.3
±9
9.
2
75
57
.3
±2
01
.2
57
15
.3
±1
49
.5
66
58
.3
±1
51
.7
X
0
X
12
0.
1±
11
.8
20
1.
9±
15
.5
N
U
L
L
12
6.
6±
15
.1
18
8.
4±
16
.5
N
U
L
L
23
6.
3±
13
.8
N
U
L
L
N
U
L
L
Z
2
Z
34
15
89
.9
±5
78
9.
6
28
85
57
8.
7
±2
62
91
.5
81
52
23
9.
7
±1
53
05
1.
7
86
85
4.
9
±1
45
8.
3
89
39
01
.8
±1
21
10
.0
23
08
00
3.
1
±4
12
97
.7
27
16
88
.1
±3
81
2.
4
64
77
88
.3
±1
43
40
.1
93
27
7.
2
±1
14
5.
7
Z
1
Z
18
78
9.
9
±2
35
.3
13
37
07
.8
±4
35
.9
70
24
9.
0
±1
13
6.
4
12
34
2.
7
±2
50
.8
88
98
9.
3
±1
69
8.
2
46
30
8.
4
±2
70
.7
65
14
0.
2
±9
95
.3
31
45
0.
7
±6
07
.3
21
22
9.
4
±2
81
.8
Z
0
Z
11
9.
4±
13
.1
10
27
.6
±4
8.
4
N
U
L
L
12
7.
0±
13
.7
58
9.
6±
35
.6
N
U
L
L
45
6.
8±
18
.6
N
U
L
L
N
U
L
L
X
2
Z
34
77
85
.7
±1
59
5.
7
29
93
23
0.
8
±4
81
5.
9
29
17
52
.5
±2
58
5.
1
86
73
7.
4
±1
63
8.
3
89
14
06
.4
±8
56
0.
7
16
91
39
.3
±2
99
9.
7
27
09
12
.9
±2
95
9.
6
67
14
8.
5
±1
59
3.
0
14
66
2.
1
±2
21
.0
X
1
Z
18
47
4.
7
±4
01
.0
13
13
17
.7
±1
23
3.
1
44
90
01
.8
±7
19
8.
0
12
38
2.
3
±3
07
.3
88
13
4.
9
±1
18
0.
9
19
50
19
.6
±2
43
7.
9
65
30
5.
2
±7
65
.7
85
26
3.
0
±2
73
1.
9
44
47
5.
4
±1
01
1.
4
X
0
Z
12
1.
7±
10
.9
10
15
.8
±4
5.
3
N
U
L
L
12
4.
5±
12
.0
59
1.
6±
29
.7
N
U
L
L
45
4.
7±
23
.5
N
U
L
L
N
U
L
L
Z
2
X
33
90
96
.4
±3
40
2.
7
32
12
68
.0
±2
89
7.
1
17
39
10
.1
±1
72
5.
4
82
94
8.
8
±5
28
.8
91
94
3.
3
±1
34
7.
1
80
23
8.
4
±1
16
8.
3
27
74
5.
8
±6
90
.8
39
80
2.
4
±7
71
.1
12
86
8.
8
±2
92
.3
Z
1
X
18
12
7.
1
±2
41
.5
14
02
5.
7
±2
68
.3
19
13
.4
±5
2.
7
11
86
4.
5
±1
85
.8
95
35
.2
±1
58
.6
21
74
.9
±4
6.
4
73
27
.3
±1
82
.7
26
96
.9
±7
1.
8
41
57
.0
±9
5.
1
Z
0
X
12
1.
1±
13
.2
19
9.
8±
14
.6
N
U
L
L
12
6.
7±
19
.0
18
5.
3±
13
.1
N
U
L
L
23
9.
2±
16
.5
N
U
L
L
N
U
L
L
E
rr
or
G
ai
n
s
X
2
X
61
02
.5
±8
26
.0
66
46
.1
±5
85
.4
17
3.
2
±2
5.
1
21
82
.3
±2
65
.5
26
80
.2
±4
10
.9
15
9.
6
±3
3.
7
10
50
.0
±1
16
.7
13
5.
6
±1
6.
4
92
.9
±1
0.
1
X
1
X
67
6.
2±
57
.2
54
9.
3±
30
.3
47
1.
9±
43
.5
67
4.
9±
84
.0
50
2.
4±
47
.6
44
1.
9±
34
.9
57
2.
0±
36
.5
46
5.
1±
36
.9
72
7.
7±
61
.4
X
0
X
58
.7
±7
.4
10
2.
5±
11
.7
N
U
L
L
63
.1
±9
.8
93
.8
±1
0.
7
N
U
L
L
11
5.
9±
9.
7
N
U
L
L
N
U
L
L
Z
2
Z
79
69
.1
±8
90
.3
55
92
1.
2
±5
97
8.
7
15
54
37
.3
±1
51
26
.6
22
84
.4
±1
69
.8
15
28
3.
9
±8
37
.0
44
79
5.
7
±1
05
6.
5
53
87
.8
±5
18
.6
13
13
7.
3
±6
93
.9
22
41
.6
±1
32
.3
Z
1
Z
74
8.
5
±4
4.
7
36
87
.2
±3
15
.7
54
46
.5
±3
74
.7
67
7.
6
±4
5.
1
22
90
.0
±7
6.
8
27
85
.2
±1
31
.7
19
30
.9
±1
26
.5
18
43
.4
±4
6.
0
15
88
.0
±7
1.
8
Z
0
Z
59
.8
±8
.3
51
5.
9±
24
.8
N
U
L
L
63
.6
±8
.6
29
4.
0±
25
.4
N
U
L
L
22
9.
2±
19
.1
N
U
L
L
N
U
L
L
R
7.
36
E
-0
6
±2
.6
7E
-0
7
4.
15
E
-0
5
±2
.3
4E
-0
6
1.
57
E
-0
4
±7
.2
6E
-0
6
9.
53
E
-0
7
±7
.5
8E
-0
8
8.
90
E
-0
6
±5
.4
3E
-0
7
3.
16
E
-0
5
±2
.4
2E
-0
6
1.
35
E
-0
6
±2
.6
0E
-0
7
5.
36
E
-0
6
±7
.2
6E
-0
7
2.
62
E
-0
7
±9
.0
3E
-0
8
